A recurring procedural issue in writ litigation concerns the extent of the High Court’s power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly whether relief can be granted even when such relief has not been expressly articulated in the prayer clause of the writ petition. This question frequently arises in situations where the petitioner successfully establishes illegality, arbitrariness, or violation of fundamental or legal rights, but the relief as framed is either incomplete, imperfect, or narrowly worded.
The answer to this issue lies in understanding the true nature of writ jurisdiction. Article 226 confers upon High Courts a constitutional power that is equitable, discretionary, and fundamentally remedial in character. Unlike civil proceedings governed by rigid procedural frameworks, writ proceedings are designed to address public law wrongs and ensure that justice is not defeated by technicalities. The emphasis, therefore, is not on the form in which relief is prayed for, but on whether the Court can provide an effective remedy on the basis of the facts pleaded and the illegality demonstrated.
The language employed in Article 226 is of particular significance. The provision empowers High Courts to issue “any appropriate writ, order or direction”. The expression “any appropriate” has been consistently interpreted as an intentional conferment of wide discretion. The constitutional framers consciously avoided restrictive terminology so that High Courts are not rendered powerless when faced with evolving forms of injustice or administrative arbitrariness. As a result, writ courts are not expected to deny relief merely because the prayer clause does not expressly mirror the relief ultimately required to cure the illegality.
This expansive understanding of Article 226 has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court of India. In Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, the Supreme Court described Article 226 as being couched in comprehensive phraseology, conferring wide powers on High Courts to “reach injustice wherever it is found”. The Court emphasised that the Constitution deliberately uses broad language so that constitutional courts can mould reliefs to meet the peculiar requirements of each case. The judgment clearly establishes that the High Court is not confined to the exact relief set out in the prayer clause, so long as the relief granted is justified by the facts pleaded and is necessary to remedy the injustice identified.
The same principle was reiterated in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court held that while exercising the power of judicial review, courts are not only entitled but also expected to mould relief in appropriate cases. The focus of judicial review, the Court observed, is on ensuring fairness, legality, and reasonableness in administrative decision-making. Procedural imperfections in the framing of relief cannot override substantive justice, particularly when the parties have fully contested the issues arising from the pleadings.
However, the power to grant relief beyond the prayer clause is not without limits. A critical distinction consistently recognised in constitutional jurisprudence is the difference between granting relief beyond the prayer and granting relief beyond the pleadings. While the former is permissible, the latter is impermissible. Pleadings constitute the factual foundation of the writ petition and define the scope of the controversy between the parties. The High Court cannot grant relief based on facts that are not pleaded, nor can it introduce a new cause of action or adjudicate upon issues that do not arise from the writ petition.
The jurisdiction to mould relief operates strictly within the framework of the pleadings. The Court may grant a relief that has not been specifically prayed for, but only if such relief flows naturally from the facts already placed on record. The Court cannot construct an entirely new case for the petitioner or travel beyond the factual matrix pleaded merely because it possesses wide constitutional powers.
Another important limitation on the grant of unprayed relief is the principle of absence of prejudice. The respondent must have had a fair and reasonable opportunity to meet the case arising from the pleadings. If the grant of a relief not expressly prayed for would take the respondent by surprise, or deprive them of an opportunity to address the legal or factual basis of such relief, courts ordinarily decline to exercise this power. Conversely, where the respondent has contested the factual and legal issues forming the basis of the relief, the mere absence of a specific prayer does not operate as a bar.
In practical terms, High Courts often grant consequential or incidental reliefs that logically and inevitably follow from the findings recorded in the judgment. This approach is particularly adopted to prevent unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. Denying such relief on technical grounds would compel the petitioner to initiate fresh litigation on the same factual foundation, thereby defeating the purpose of constitutional remedies and burdening the judicial system.
At the same time, High Courts exercise this power with caution. Reliefs that fundamentally alter the nature of the writ petition, involve adjudication of disputed questions of fact requiring evidence, or encroach upon areas more appropriately decided in a civil trial are ordinarily not granted under Article 226. The equitable nature of writ jurisdiction does not convert it into a substitute for a full-fledged trial.
In conclusion, while Article 226 vests High Courts with wide and flexible powers, those powers are structured by well-settled judicial limitations. A High Court may grant relief even if it is not specifically prayed for, provided such relief is rooted in the pleadings, flows naturally from the facts established, causes no prejudice to the respondent, and is necessary to remedy illegality or injustice. What is impermissible is the grant of relief that is wholly outside the case set up by the petitioner or which introduces a new cause of action under the guise of equitable jurisdiction. The consistent judicial approach thus balances constitutional flexibility with procedural fairness, ensuring that justice is effective without becoming arbitrary.
Authored by,
Sri Harsha Vempati (BITS Mumbai)
Under the Guidance of Ms. Muskan Joshi, Advocate
RVR Associates, IPR Attorneys and Advocates